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The Interpretive Exercise under the General Anti-Avoidance Rule
David G. Duff*

Introduction
According to subsection 245(4) of the Income Tax Act (the Act)1 the general antiavoidance rule (“GAAR”) applies to an avoidance transaction only if it is reasonable to
consider that the transaction would, but for the GAAR, result directly or indirectly in a
misuse of one or more provisions of the Act or other relevant enactments, including tax
treaties, or an abuse having regard to those provisions other than the GAAR read as a
whole.2 Subsection 245(4) was added to the GAAR to ensure that it does not apply to “taxmotivated transactions that are otherwise in accordance with the object and spirit of the
provisions of the Act,”3 and “draws a line between legitimate tax minimization and abusive
tax avoidance” by asking whether the avoidance transaction at issue is consistent with, or
frustrates or defeats, the object, spirit, and purpose of the relevant provisions.4 For this
reason, application of the GAAR ultimately depends on an interpretive exercise to
determine the object, spirit, and purpose of these provisions.

*

Professor of Law and Director, Tax LLM Program, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British

Columbia.
1

RSC 1985 c. 1 (as amended).

2

Although the French version of the ITA uses the same word, “abus,” instead of separate words misuse and

abuse, it distinguishes between an abuse in the application of one or more of the provisions of the ITA and
other relevant enactments, including tax treaties (“dans l’application des dispositions d’un ou de plusieurs
des textes suivant”), and an abuse in the application of those provisions read as a whole (dans l’application
de ces dispositions … lues dans leur ensemble”).
3

David Dodge, “A New and More Coherent Approach to Tax Avoidance” (1988), 36:1 Canadian Tax

Journal 1, at 20.
4

Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada, 2005 SCC 54, at paragraphs 16 and 57 (Canada Trustco).

1

Since the object, spirit, and purpose of a provision is also taken into account under
the “textual, contextual and purposive” (TCP) approach to the interpretation of statutes
endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada,5 an obvious issue in the application of the
misuse or abuse test is the relationship between “ordinary interpretation” under the TCP
approach and the interpretive exercise under the GAAR. Another important issue in the
application of this provision is the method by which the object, spirit, and purpose of
provisions is construed in order to determine whether an avoidance transaction results in a
misuse of specific provisions or an abuse having regard to provisions read as a whole.
This chapter examines the interpretive exercise under the GAAR, contrasting this
interpretive exercise with ordinary interpretation under the TCP approach, and considering
the way in which the object, spirit, and purpose of the relevant provisions is determined in
order to decide whether an avoidance transaction is subject to the GAAR. The first part
distinguishes the interpretive exercise under the GAAR from the TCP approach, explaining
that ordinary interpretation under the TCP approach is rightly constrained by the text of the
applicable provisions in a way that the interpretive exercise under the GAAR is not. The
second part addresses the way in which the object, spirit, and purpose of the relevant
provisions is interpreted, criticizing the “unified textual, contextual and purposive”
approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada,6 and
arguing that separate inquiries into a misuse of specific provisions and an abuse having
regard to provisions read as a whole is not only consistent with the Court’s admonition in
Canada Trustco against judicial reliance on overarching or overriding policies that are not
anchored in the interpretation of the relevant provisions, but mandated by the text of
subsection 245(4).

5

Ibid., at paragraph 10.

6

Ibid., at paragraphs 38 to 43.
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I.

The TCP Approach and the Interpretive Exercise Under the GAAR
Although the object, spirit, or purpose of a provision is central to the interpretive

exercise under the GAAR it also plays a role in the TCP approach. For this reason, it might
be argued that this method of interpretation renders the GAAR irrelevant—since the
application of the GAAR is not necessary to deny tax benefits where the relevant provisions
are already interpreted in accordance with their object, spirit, and purpose to deny abusive
transactions, and those provisions do not apply to transactions that are consistent with the
object, spirit, and purpose of the relevant provisions.7 Alternatively, it could be argued that
the interpretive exercise under the GAAR presumes a literal approach to the ordinary
interpretation of tax statutes and treaties, which is contrary to the TCP approach.8
Both of these arguments find support in the Supreme Court’s decision in Canada
Trustco, which repeatedly conflates the interpretive exercise under the GAAR with the
TCP approach,9 and further states that the role of the GAAR is “to negate arrangements
that would be permissible under a literal interpretation of other provisions” of the ITA.10
In contrast, in Copthorne Holdings Ltd. v. Canada,11 the court clearly distinguishes the
7

See, for example, Brian J. Arnold and James R. Wilson, “The General Anti-Avoidance Rule – Part 2” (1988),

46:5 Canadian Tax Journal 1123 at 1172.
8

See, for example, Brian J. Arnold, “Policy Forum: Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court’s Approach to

the Determination of Abuse Under the General Anti-Avoidance Rule” (2014) 62:1 Canadian Tax Journal
113 at 125-26.
9

Canada Trustco, supra note 4, at paragraph 40, stating that there is “but one principle of interpretation”; at

paragraph 47, stating that “subsection 245(4) requires the court to look beyond the mere text of the provisions
and undertake a contextual and purposive approach to interpretation in order to find a meaning that
harmonizes the wording, object, spirit and purpose of the provisions”; at paragraph 51, stating that the
provisions giving rise to a tax benefit “must be interpreted in their legislative context, together with other
related and relevant provisions, in light of the purposes that are promoted by those provisions and their
statutory schemes”; and at paragraph 58, stating that the “central issue” in the analysis of abusive tax
avoidance is “the proper interpretation of the relevant provisions in light of their context and purpose.” I
return to this point below; see the text accompanying notes 71 to 75.
10

Ibid., at paragraph 13 [emphasis added].

11

2011 SCC 63 (Copthorne).
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interpretative exercise under the GAAR from ordinary interpretation under the TCP
approach, explaining that ordinary interpretation applies a “textual, contextual and
purposive analysis to determine what the words of the statute mean,” whereas a GAAR
analysis employs this approach to determine the object, spirit, or purpose of the relevant
provisions or “rationale that underlies the words” in order to apply the misuse or abuse test
in subsection 245(4).12
The following sections examine the ordinary method of interpretation under the
TCP approach and the interpretive exercise under the GAAR, explaining how (and why)
they differ. As the first section explains, although the TCP approach departs from literal
interpretation by considering the broader context and purpose of a provision as well as its
text, the text continues to play a dominant role in the interpretive process by limiting the
influence of contextual and purposive considerations to plausible meanings of the relevant
text and outweighing these other interpretive considerations where they conflict with the
text. In contrast, as the second section explains, the function of the interpretive exercise
under the GAAR is not to determine the meaning of the text, but to override this meaning
in order to deny a tax benefit that would otherwise result from an avoidance transaction
that results in a misuse of the relevant provisions or an abuse having regard to the
provisions as ordinarily interpreted. While in ordinary interpretation an emphasis on the
text reflects rule of law principles of legal certainty and legislative supremacy, in the
context of the GAAR, an emphasis on the object, spirit, and purpose of the relevant
provisions is justified to distinguish legitimate tax minimization from abusive tax
avoidance.
1.

Textual, Contextual, and Purposive Interpretation
According to E.A Driedger’s “modern rule” of statutory interpretation, “the words

of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense
harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of

12

Ibid., at paragraph 70.

4

Parliament.” 13 First endorsed by the Supreme Court in Stubart Investments Ltd. v.
Canada,14 this method of interpretation was reaffirmed and renamed the TCP approach in
Canada Trustco,15 and reaffirmed in subsequent Supreme Court decisions as the approved
method for interpreting tax legislation.16 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
establishes a similar approach for interpreting treaties, including tax treaties, and provides
that treaties “shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”17
Since a TCP approach provides that the words or terms of a provision are to be read
“harmoniously with” or “in light of” their objects and purposes and the schemes of which
they are a part, this method of interpretation differs from literal approaches such as strict
construction or the plain meaning rule. Under strict construction, which was the dominant
method for interpreting tax statutes in Canada until the Supreme Court’s decision in
Stubart,18 tax provisions were interpreted literally, without any regard to their objects or

13

E.A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983), at 87.

14

[1984] 1 SCR 536 at paragraph 61 (Stubart).

15

Supra note 4, at paragraph 10, quoting Driedger’s modern rule and stating that “[t]he interpretation of a

statutory provision must be made according to a textual, contextual and purposive analysis to find a meaning
that is harmonious with the Act as a whole.”
16

See, for example, Lipson v. Canada, 2009 SCC 1, at paragraph 26; Copthorne, supra note 11, at paragraph

70; Craig v. Canada, 2012 SCC 43, at paragraph 38; and Canada (National Revenue) v. Thompson, 2016
SCC 21, at paragraph 32.
17

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31(1), signed at Vienna on May 23, 1969, UN doc.

A/Conf. 39/27, fourth annex, UNTS 1155/331 (Vienna Convention).
18

Supra note 15, at paragraph 60, referring to “the demise of the strict interpretation rule for the construction

of taxing statutes.” The Supreme Court reaffirmed its rejection of strict construction two years later in Golden
v. The Queen, [1986] SCR 209, at paragraph 10, stating that strict construction “no longer finds a place in
the canons of interpretation applicable to taxation statutes” and that the Stubart decision “recognized that in
the construction of taxation statutes the law is not confined to a literal and virtually meaningless interpretation
of the Act where the words will support on a broader construction a conclusion which is workable and in
harmony with the evident purposes of the Act in question.”
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purposes or the broader context of the schemes of which they are a part.19 Under the plain
meaning rule that the Supreme Court affirmed from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, the
broader context and purpose of a provision could be considered only to resolve ambiguities
resulting from a literal interpretation of the provision.20 In contrast to these methods of
interpretation, the TCP approach allows contextual and purposive considerations to be
taken into account in all circumstances, not only to resolve ambiguities but to reveal
ambiguities where none might otherwise be apparent on a literal reading of the text.
Although the TCP approach provides that the text of a provision should be read
harmoniously with the scheme of which the provision is a part as well as with its objects
and purposes, it is important to recognize that these interpretive considerations are not
given equal weight. On the contrary, since the function of contextual and purposive
analysis under the TCP approach is to determine the meaning of the relevant text, the text
necessarily plays a leading role in the interpretive process, limiting the influence of
contextual and purposive considerations and outweighing these considerations where they
conflict with any plausible meaning of the text. This emphasis on the text reflects two core
principles associated with the rule of law: (1) the principle of legislative supremacy, which
requires courts to be attentive to the text that the legislature has approved in the form of
legislation or the ratification of a treaty; and (2) a principle of legal certainty according to
which persons should generally be able to rely on the apparent meaning of a legal text in
order to govern their affairs.21
As a result, under a TCP approach, while contextual and purposive considerations
may displace the ordinary or literal meaning of a text, the alternative meaning that is

19

For a detailed explanation, see David G. Duff, “Interpreting the Income Tax Act—Part 1: Interpretive

Doctrines” (1999), 47:3 Canadian Tax Journal 464, at 469-477.
20

Ibid., at 504-517.

21

See, for example, William N. Eskridge Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, “Statutory Interpretation as Practical

Reasoning” [1990] 42 Stanford Law Review 321 at 354.
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selected must be a plausible meaning that the words are reasonably capable of bearing.22
For example, in D & D Livestock Ltd. v. Canada,23 where the minister argued that a tax
benefit (the duplication of safe income) resulting from a complex series of transactions
carried out by the taxpayer should be denied because it was contrary to the object and
purpose of subsection 55(2) of the Act (as it then read), the Tax Court rightly dismissed
this argument on the grounds that the minister was asking the court “to give effect to the
purpose of the subsection in spite of its wording rather than interpreting its wording in a
manner which gives effect to its purpose.”24 Notably, however, the court emphasized that
the minister can always challenge abusive transactions under the GAAR.25
Moreover, where interpretive considerations point in different directions, a TCP
approach weighs textual considerations more heavily than contextual and purposive
considerations,

and

contextual

considerations

more

heavily

than

purposive

considerations.26 For example, in Stapley v. Canada,27 where the taxpayer sought to deduct
the full cost of gift certificates for food and beverages and tickets to concerts and sporting
events that he give to clients for promotional purposes, the Federal Court of Appeal relied
on the text of subsection 67.1(1) and its context within the scheme of section 67.1 as a
whole to conclude that the allowable deduction was limited to 50 percent of the amount
claimed,28 notwithstanding its view that the application of the provision on the facts of the

22

See, for example, Ruth Sullivan, “Statutory Interpretation in a New Nutshell” [2003] 82 Canadian Bar

Review 51 at 60, referring to the “plausible meaning rule” according to which a meaning that “give[s] effect
to the actual or presumed intentions of the legislature, … must be one the words are capable of bearing.”
23

2013 TCC 318 (D & D Livestock).

24

Ibid., at paragraph 32, adding (at paragraph 33) that the TCP method of interpretation affirmed in Canada

Trustco does not “give me the authority to simply re-write the subsection to give effect to its purpose.”
25

Ibid., at paragraph 34.

26

See, for example, David G. Duff, “Interpreting the Income Tax Act – Part 2: Toward a Pragmatic Approach”

(1999) 47 Canadian Tax Journal 741 at 795, arguing that a “pragmatic approach” to statutory interpretation
accords “greater weight to apparently unambiguous words supported by their immediate context than to other
elements of statutory meaning.”
27

2006 FCA 36.

28

Ibid., at paragraphs 12 to 21.
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case would contradict the purpose of the provision to limit the deduction of expenses that
include an element of personal consumption.29 According to the Court, “the statute dictates
the result in this case.”30
As a result, as the Supreme Court observed in Canada Trustco, although courts
should always “seek to read the provisions of an Act as a harmonious whole,” the “relative
effects of ordinary meaning, context and purpose on the interpretive process may vary.”31
On the one hand, where the text of a provision is “precise and unequivocal,” the ordinary
meaning of the text should play “a dominant role in the interpretive process.”32 On the
other hand, where the text “can support more than one reasonable meaning,” “the ordinary
meaning of the words plays a lesser role.”33 However, in each case, the text constrains the
range of permissible interpretations, consistent with principles of legislative supremacy
and legal certainty.
In addition, as the court also explained in Canada Trustco, because the Act is
“dominated by explicit provisions dictating specific consequences,” the text of this statute
itself invites “a largely textual interpretation”34—suggesting a greater emphasis on the text
of most provisions of the Act than on their broader contexts or purposes. However,
according to the court, this approach should not be confused with a literal or plain meaning
approach, since contextual and purposive considerations may be relied on to “reveal or
resolve latent ambiguities” even where the meaning of a particular provision “may not
appear to be ambiguous at first glance.”35

29

Ibid., at paragraphs 22-27.

30

Ibid., at paragraph 31.

31

Canada Trustco, supra note 4, at paragraph 10.

32

Ibid.

33

Ibid.

34

Ibid., at paragraph 13.

35

Ibid., at paragraph 47.
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2.

The Interpretive Exercise under the GAAR
While the TCP approach regards the text of a provision as the primary consideration

in its interpretation and takes the broader context and purpose of the provision into account
in order to interpret the meaning of the text, the interpretive exercise under the GAAR
reverses this order, relying on the object, spirit, or purpose of provisions to override their
meaning as ordinarily interpreted in order to deny tax benefits that would otherwise result
from avoidance transactions resulting in a misuse of specific provisions or an abuse having
regard to these provisions read as a whole. As a result, as the Supreme Court stated in
Copthorne,36 the GAAR is “a legal mechanism whereby Parliament has conferred on the
court the unusual duty of going behind the words of the legislation” to deny tax benefits
that would otherwise result from avoidance transactions that contradict the object, spirit,
or purpose of the relevant provisions.37 Judith Freedman makes a similar point, observing
that the interpretive exercise under general anti-avoidance rules and principles is “an
unusual form of interpretation” that “goes beyond” what is normally understood as
statutory interpretation.38
Since, unlike ordinary interpretation under the TCP approach, this “unusual form
of interpretation” is not constrained by the text, it is often argued that GAARs contradict
the rule of law principle that laws should ideally be reasonably certain and predictable.39
However, this departure from the principle of legal certainty is arguably consistent with
the rule of law, on the grounds that it is necessary to discourage and counteract taxmotivated transactions that undermine the integrity of the law by complying with the text

36

Supra note 11.

37

Ibid., at paragraph 66.

38

Judith Freedman, “The Anatomy of Tax Avoidance Counteraction: Abuse of Law in a Tax Context at

Member State and European Union Level,” in Rita de la Feria and Stefan Vogenauer, eds., Prohibition of
Abuse of Law: A New Principle of EU Law? (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), 365 at 375-76.
39

See, for example, Rebecca Prebble and John Prebble, “Does the Use of General Anti-Avoidance Rules to

Combat Tax Avoidance Breach Principles of the Rule of Law? A Comparative Study” (2010) 55 Saint Louis
University Law Journal 21 at 28-30.

9

of the relevant provisions without also adhering to their object, spirit, or purpose.40 As a
result, while the principle of legal certainty generally prohibits courts from invoking the
object, spirit, and purpose of a provision to override its meaning as ordinarily interpreted,
this principle is legitimately superseded by an anti-abuse principle where an avoidance
transaction is undertaken or arranged in order to obtain a tax benefit.41
In order to interpret the object, spirit, and purpose of a provision, courts necessarily
consider the same interpretive sources to which they refer to determine the meaning of its
text: the text itself, the broader context of related provisions that comprise a scheme of
which the specific provision is a part, and extrinsic evidence of the provision’s purpose
including the history of the relevant enactment and authoritative statements regarding its
purpose. 42 As a result, as the Supreme Court noted in Copthorne, 43 the same textual,
contextual, and purposive method of analysis that is used to determine the meaning of a
provision under the TCP approach may also be used to identify its object, spirit, or purpose
in a GAAR analysis. Although the method of analysis may be the same, the aim and
function of the interpretive exercises differ, since the TCP approach applies a textual,
contextual, and purposive analysis to determine what the words of the relevant provisions
mean, while a GAAR analysis employs a textual, contextual, and purposive analysis to
determine their object, spirit, or purpose.44

40

David G. Duff, “General Anti-Avoidance Rules Revisited: Reflections on Tim Edgar’s ‘Building a Better

GAAR’” (2020), 68:2 Canadian Tax Journal 579 at 589-591, arguing that, if properly designed, a GAAR is
consistent with the rule of law.
41

Ibid., at 595-596.

42

See, for example, Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statues, 6th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis

Butterworths, 2014), chapter 9, explaining that reasonable interpretations with respect to the purposes of
legislative provisions are generally based on plausible inferences from the text of the provisions, the broader
schemes of which they are a part, and the history of the relevant enactment, in addition to authoritative
statements in extrinsic materials.
43

Supra note 11, at paragraph 70.

44

Ibid.
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To say that the interpretive exercise under the GAAR may result in the GAAR
overriding the meaning of the text as ordinarily interpreted does not mean that the process
of ordinary interpretation should revert to a literal approach in GAAR cases—although the
Supreme Court, in several passages in Canada Trustco and Mathew v. Canada,45 appears
to have assumed this relationship declaring that the purpose of the GAAR is to deny tax
benefits that would otherwise result from a “literal application” of other provisions of the
Act.46 In contrast, in Copthorne, 47 the Supreme Court states that the GAAR applies to
transactions that are “in strict compliance with the text of the relevant provisions relied
upon,” 48 without suggesting that the meaning of these provisions is based on a literal
interpretation. On the contrary, although the Copthorne decision also contrasts “the
rationale that underlies the words” with “the bare meaning of the words themselves,”49 the
court is clear that the “traditional statutory interpretation approach” that is used to
determine “what the words of the statute mean” is a TCP approach that combines “textual,
contextual and purposive analysis.”50 Indeed, since the GAAR is generally recognized as
“a provision of last resort,”51 it makes sense that it should apply only where an avoidance
transaction results in a tax benefit under tax provisions as ordinarily interpreted under the
TCP approach.
Since the TCP approach is ultimately constrained by the text of the relevant
provisions in a way that the interpretive exercise under the GAAR is not, the TCP approach
does not render the GAAR irrelevant. On the contrary, although these interpretive exercises
both consider the broader context and purpose of the provisions at issue, the TCP approach
takes contextual and purposive considerations into account in order to determine the
meaning of the text, while the interpretive exercise under the GAAR takes these

45

2005 SCC 55 (Mathew).

46

Canada Trustco, supra note 4, at paragraphs 1, 13, and 49; and Mathew, supra note 45, at paragraph 46.

47

Supra note 11.

48

Ibid., at paragraph 66.

49

Ibid., at paragraph 70.

50

Ibid.

51

Canada Trustco, supra note 4, at paragraph 21.
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considerations into account in order to determine the object, spirit, and purpose of the
relevant provisions, which is relied on to deny a tax benefit that would otherwise result
from an avoidance transaction that misuses or abuses the relevant provisions as ordinarily
interpreted.52

II.

Interpreting the Object, Spirit, and Purpose of the Relevant Provisions
Since subsection 245(4) refers to a misuse of provisions and an abuse having regard

to provisions read as a whole, one might expect that the interpretive exercise under
subsection 245(4) would involve two inquiries: one regarding the object, spirit, and
purpose of the specific provisions that may be misused in order to obtain a tax benefit, and
the other regarding the object, spirit, and purpose of the broader scheme that may have
been abused by the avoidance transaction at issue. 53 Indeed, this was the interpretive
approach adopted by the Federal Court of Appeal in OSFC Holdings Ltd. v. Canada,54
concluding that subsection 245(4) contemplates two tests, one addressing the specific
provisions at issue and another considering the broader scheme of which they are a part.55
However, in Canada Trustco, the Supreme Court rejected this interpretation,
concluding that subsection 245(4) “requires a single, unified approach to the textual,
contextual and purposive interpretation of the specific provisions of the Income Tax Act
52

For a similar point, see Marc Darmo and Olivier Fournier, “Recent Developments Regarding the

Application of Subsection 245(4)” in Report of Proceedings of the Sixty-Third Tax Conference, 2011
Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2012), 37:1-33 at 6-7, explaining that the focus
under subsection 245(4) is “entirely different” from that under ordinary interpretation, since “the words of
the relevant provision do not necessarily constrain the contextual and purposive analysis in the same way
that they do under the traditional statutory interpretation approach.”
53

See, for example, Vern Krishna, Fundamentals of Canadian Income Tax, 6th ed. (Scarborough: Carswell,

2000) at 51, stating that the misuse concept “depends upon the object and spirit of the particular provision
under scrutiny” while the abuse concept is a “wider question” requiring “an examination of the interrelationship of the relevant statutory provisions in context.”
54

2001 FCA 260 (OSFC).

55

Ibid., at paragraph 60.
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that are relied upon by the taxpayer in order to determine whether there was abusive tax
avoidance.” 56 Although the court did not question this “single unified approach” in its
subsequent decision in Copthorne,57 its emphasis on the statutory scheme at issue is a
significant departure from its emphasis in Canada Trustco on the specific provisions relied
on by the taxpayer.
The following sections consider the interpretation and application of the misuse or
abuse test in subsection 245(4), examining the interpretive frameworks established by the
Supreme Court in Canada Trustco and Copthorne and the application of these interpretive
frameworks in various GAAR cases. As the first section explains, the “single, unified
approach” adopted in Canada Trustco disregards the text of subsection 245(4), downplays
the relevance of the schemes of which provisions are a part, and conflates the interpretive
exercise under the GAAR with the ordinary interpretation of tax provisions under the TCP
approach. As the second section explains, while the modified interpretive framework
established in Copthorne is a welcome improvement on the interpretive framework
established in Canada Trustco, continued adherence to a single unified approach impedes
the coherent application of the GAAR.
1.

The Interpretive Framework in Canada Trustco and Copthorne
As noted above, in OSFC the Federal Court of Appeal concluded that subsection

245(4) contemplates separate inquiries into the object, spirit, or purpose of the provisions
relied on by a taxpayer to obtain a tax benefit, and into the object, spirit, and purpose of
the broader scheme that may be implicated by the avoidance transaction at issue. Referring
to these terms collectively as the “policy of the provisions in question or of the Act read as
a whole,”58 Justice Rothstein stated that a misuse analysis considers each specific provision
at issue and the policy behind it, while an abuse analysis considers “a wider context, having
regard to the provisions of the Income Tax Act read as a whole and the policy behind
56

Supra note 4, at paragraph 43.

57

Supra note 11, at paragraph 73.

58

OSFC, supra note 55, at paragraph 66.

13

them.”59 Although noting that the French version of subsection 245(4) uses the single word
“abus” rather than the two words “misuse” and “abuse,” Justice Rothstein considered this
distinction a matter of “linguistic nuance rather than a shading of the legislative intent,”60
concluding that the French version should be interpreted to include “both the tests in the
English version.”61
In Canada Trustco, the Supreme Court rejected this interpretation, for four reasons.
First, it observed, the French version of subsection 245(4) not only used the single word
“abus,” but also defined the test non-disjunctively as “d’abus dans l’application de
dispositions de la presénte loi lue dans son ensemble” (abuse in the application of the
provisions of the law read as a whole).62 Second, the court added, “Parliament could not
have intended this two-step approach, which on its face raises the impossible question of
how one can abuse the Act as a whole without misusing any of its provisions.”63 Third, it
declared:
There is but one principle of interpretation: to determine the intent of the legislator
having regard to the text, its context, and other indicators of legislative purpose.
The policy analysis proposed as a second step by the Federal Court of Appeal in
OSFC is properly incorporated into a unified, textual, contextual, and purposive
approach to interpreting the specific provisions that give rise to the tax benefit.64

59

Ibid., at paragraph 61. For a critical analysis of the Court’s use of the word “policy,” which anticipated the

Supreme Court’s reaction to this term in Canada Trustco, see Brian J. Arnold, “The Long, Slow, Steady
Demise of the General Anti-Avoidance Rule” (2004) 52:2 Canadian Tax Journal 488, at 498-499, arguing
that the use of the word “policy” as opposed to “statutory scheme” is “prejudicial to the application of the
GAAR” since “judges inevitably prefer statutory words over unexpressed notions of parliamentary policy.”
60

Ibid., at paragraph 60, citing RMM Canadian Enterprises v. The Queen, [1998] 1 CTC 2300 (TCC), at

paragraph 49, per Justice Bowman.
61

Ibid., at paragraph 61.

62

Canada Trustco, supra note 4, at paragraph 38.

63

Ibid., at paragraph 39.

64

Ibid., at paragraph 39.
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Finally, it stated, “courts cannot search for an overriding policy of the Act that is not based
on a unified, textual, contextual and purposive interpretation of the specific provisions at
issue,” since such a search would be “incompatible with the roles of reviewing judges” and
“would run counter to the overall policy of Parliament that tax law be certain, predictable
and fair, so that taxpayers can intelligently order their affairs”—thereby contradicting rule
of law principles of legislative supremacy and legal certainty.65
None of these reasons for rejecting the two-step approach adopted in OSFC
withstands serious scrutiny.
Beginning with the French version of the Act, the Supreme Court’s decision not
only ignores the language in the English version, which refers to an abuse having regard to
provisions of the Act other than the GAAR read as a whole, but also reads down the French
version as if it referred only to the abuse of “specific provisions that give rise to the tax
benefit,” not to an abuse in the application of the provisions of the Act read as a whole
(“dans son ensemble”). More important, the 2005 amendments to subsection 245(4)
clarified that the English and French versions both contemplate two separate inquiries,
since each inquiry is now contained in a separate paragraph and the French version now
explicitly refers to “un abus dans l’application des dispositions” (an abuse in the application
of the provisions) in paragraph 245(4)(a) and “un abus dans l’application de ces
dispositions … lues dans leur ensemble” (an abuse in the application of these provisions
… read as a whole) in paragraph 245(4)(b), and prefaces these paragraphs with the words
“selon le cas” (depending on the case).66 Although in Canada Trustco the Supreme Court
stated that these amendments “would not warrant a different approach to the issues on
appeal,”67 this conclusion is plainly incorrect with respect to the two-step approach adopted
in OSFC.

65

Ibid., at paragraphs 41 and 42.

66

Budget Implementation Act, 2004, No. 2, SC 2005, c. 19, section 52.

67

Canada Trustco, supra note 4, at paragraph 7, also concluding that the amendments, which were enacted

to apply retroactively after the case was argued but before the decision was released, “cannot apply at this
stage of appellate review after the parties argued their cases and the Tax Court judge rendered his decision

15

The second argument—that Parliament could not have intended a two-step
approach because it is inconceivable how one could abuse the Act as a whole without
misusing any of its provisions—ignores the relevance of broader schemes that may be
implicated by avoidance transactions. While the use of one or more provisions to achieve
a result that is contrary to their object, spirit, and purpose clearly misuses these provisions,
the circumvention of a provision may contradict the object, spirit, or purpose of a scheme
of which the provision is a part without specifically misusing any specific provision.68 As
a result, while the analysis of a misuse of specific provisions and an abuse having regard
to the provisions of the Act read as a whole may have been “inseparable” on the facts in
Canada Trustco,69 that is not always the case and separate inquiries may be required to
ensure that the GAAR is coherently applied.
The third argument—that there is only “one principle of interpretation” such that
“the policy analysis proposed as a second step by the Federal Court of Appeal in OSFC is
properly incorporated into a unified, textual, contextual, and purposive approach to
interpreting the specific provisions that give rise to the tax benefit” —not only misconstrues
what OSFC understood as “policy” analysis, but also erroneously conflates the TCP
approach and the interpretive exercise under the GAAR.70 As explained earlier, the use of
the term “policy” in OSFC referred to the object, spirit, and purpose of specific provisions
and the Act read as a whole, not to the second step of the two-step approach that the court
employed.71 More important, as explained in the first part of this chapter, the interpretive
exercise under the GAAR differs from ordinary interpretation under the TCP approach.72
on the basis of the GAAR as it read prior to the amendment.” Whether this is correct as a matter of law is an
interesting question, which the analysis does not address.
68

See, for example, Darmo and Fournier, supra note 53, at 37:14, stating that: “For the GAAR to apply when

a transaction circumvents a specific rule, a legislative scheme that includes the rule will generally have to be
frustrated.”
69

Supra note 4, at paragraph 39, citing the Tax Court decision at paragraph 90.

70

See also supra note 9 and accompanying text.

71

See above in the text accompanying notes 59 and 60.

72

See above in the text accompanying notes 36 to 53.
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As a result, as the Supreme Court confirmed in Copthorne, although courts may use the
same TCP approach to determine “what the words of the statute mean” and “the rationale
that underlies the words,”73 the interpretive exercise under the GAAR involves a very
different principle of interpretation than that under the TCP approach – one that requires
courts to perform “the unusual duty of going behind the words of the legislation” to
determine whether an avoidance transaction results in a misuse of specific provisions or an
abuse having regard to the provisions read as a whole.74
Finally, although the Supreme Court rightly held in Canada Trustco that principles
of legislative supremacy and legal certainty would make it inappropriate to apply the
GAAR based on an “overriding policy” of the Act that is not “anchored in” an analysis of
the relevant provisions,75 this is clearly not what Justice Rothstein meant in OSFC when
he used the word “policy” to refer to the object, spirit, and purpose of specific provisions
and the Act read as a whole.76 On the contrary, as the decision in OSFC itself indicates, the
“policy” analysis conducted by the court was based on an analysis of the relevant
provisions and the broader statutory scheme that was implicated by the transactions at
issue.77 As a result, as the court explained in Copthorne, while it is not permissible for
courts to base a finding of abuse on “some broad statement of policy ... which is not
attached to the provisions at issue,” the GAAR may be applied where an avoidance
transaction contradicts the object, spirit, and purpose of a statutory scheme that is identified
by a contextual analysis of the provisions comprising the scheme.78
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the Supreme Court did not reject the “single
unified approach” in Copthorne, but instead reaffirmed the conclusion in Canada Trustco
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Copthorne, supra note 11, at paragraph 70.
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Ibid., at paragraph 66.
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Canada Trustco, supra note 4, at paragraph 55.
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See above in the text accompanying notes 58 and 59.
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OSFC, supra note 55, at paragraphs 73 to 81 and 82 to 101, examining the “policy” behind subsection

18(13) and the “policy” with respect to loss-trading by corporations and partnerships.
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Copthorne, supra note 11, at paragraph 118.
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that “there is no distinction between an ‘abuse’ and a ‘misuse.’”79 However, by clearly
distinguishing the interpretive exercise under the GAAR from the TCP approach and
clarifying that the contextual analysis of a statutory scheme differs from reliance on an
“overriding policy,” the court modified the interpretive framework established in Canada
Trustco, lessening the influence of textual considerations in the GAAR analysis and
increasing the influence of contextual considerations with respect to the schemes that may
be implicated by the avoidance transactions at issue.80 The following section examines the
impact of this shifting interpretive framework on key GAAR decisions and interpretive
deficiencies resulting from continuing adherence to the single unified approach.
2.

Application in GAAR Cases
As explained in the previous section, the interpretive framework established in

Canada Trustco not only combined the two-step approach in OSFC into a single unified
approach, but also downplayed the relevance of broader schemes in a GAAR analysis and
increased the importance of textual considerations in a GAAR analysis by conflating the
TCP approach and the interpretive exercise under the GAAR. In contrast, the interpretive
framework established in Copthorne emphasizes the importance of the broader schemes of
which provisions are a part and lessens the influence of textual considerations, while
nonetheless adhering to the single unified approach adopted in Canada Trustco. A review
of key GAAR cases illustrates the impact of these interpretive frameworks on the
application of the GAAR and the deficiencies of the single unified approach.

79

Ibid., at paragraph 73, citing Canada Trustco, supra note 4, at paragraph 43.

80

For a similar point, see Darmo and Fournier, supra note 53, at 37:9, explaining that the Copthorne decision

“could be read as modifying the interpretive exercise proposed under Canada Trustco from a search for the
underlying rationale of each individual provision in issue to the search for the underlying rationale of ‘the
scheme under consideration,’ which may include all of the provisions that have been either used or
circumvented by the impugned transaction.”
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(1)

Impact of Interpretive Frameworks in Canada Trustco and Copthorne
In Canada Trustco, the taxpayer carried out a circular series of transactions that

allowed it to deduct capital cost allowance (CCA) on assets that it acquired at little or no
economic cost and immediately leased back to the vendor of the assets. The minister argued
that the deductions should be disallowed on the basis that the object, spirit, or purpose of
the CCA provisions is limited to the recognition of the “real economic cost” of assets that
are used to earn income.81 Because this argument was based on explanatory notes to the
GAAR stating that provisions of the Act are “intended to apply to transactions with real
economic substance,”82 and not on a detailed analysis of the relevant provisions and the
CCA regime more generally, it is perhaps not surprising that the Supreme Court rejected
this argument.
Instead, the court concluded that, since the relevant provisions use the word “cost”
in the legal sense of “the amount paid to acquire assets” irrespective of financing
arrangements or amounts at risk,83 other provisions of the Act explicitly limit the deduction
of costs to amounts that are at risk, 84 and ordinary sale-leaseback transactions do not
contradict the purpose of the capital cost allowance provisions, 85 it was impossible to
conclude that the transactions were contrary to the object, spirit, and purpose of the relevant
provisions without invoking a concept of “economic substance” that was not based on a
textual, contextual, and purposive interpretation of the CCA provisions. 86 It is in this
context that one should understand the court’s statement that the GAAR cannot be applied
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Canada Trustco, supra note 4, at paragraphs 68 and 70.

82

Canada, Department of Finance, Explanatory Notes to Legislation Relating to Income Tax (Ottawa:

Department of Finance, 1988), clause 186, adding that that “tax incentives expressly provided for in the
legislation” are not intended to be “neutralized.”
83

Canada Trustco, supra note 4, at paragraph 74.

84

Ibid., at paragraphs 72 and 74, referring to the at-risk rules for limited partnerships in subsections 96(2.1)

to (2.7) of the Act.
85

Ibid., at paragraphs 68 and 74.
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Ibid., at paragraph 76.
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on the basis of an “overriding policy” that is not based on a textual, contextual, and
purposive interpretation of the provisions at issue.87
In contrast, several cases decided before Canada Trustco applied the GAAR based
on a contextual analysis of the relevant statutory scheme, rather than on any “overriding
policy.” For example, in McNichol v. The Queen,88 where the Tax Court applied the GAAR
to what it called “a classic example of surplus stripping,”89 the decision turned not on any
overriding policy against surplus stripping but on a contextual analysis of various
provisions, concluding that “the scheme of the Act calls for the treatment of distributions
of corporate property as income.”90 This statement was reaffirmed in RMM Enterprises
Inc. v. The Queen,91 in which Justice Bowman added that “the Income Tax Act, read as a
whole envisages that a distribution of corporate surplus to shareholders is to be taxed as a
payment of dividends.”92
In Water’s Edge Village Estates (Phase II) Ltd. v. Canada,93 where the taxpayers
acquired interests in a US partnership and claimed a terminal loss on the disposition of an
obsolete computer that had been depreciated for US but not Canadian tax purposes, the
Federal Court of Appeal referred to “the scheme of the capital cost allowance provisions”
to conclude that the transactions were contrary to the purpose of those provisions “to
recognize over time costs incurred to acquire capital assets actually used to earn income”
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Ibid., at paragraph 42.
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97 DTC 111 (TCC).
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Ibid., at paragraph 24.
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Ibid., referring to the taxation of dividends under paragraph 12(1)(j) of the Act, the taxation of shareholder

benefits under section 15, and the rules for deemed dividends in section 84. A more thorough analysis might
also have referred to sections 84.1 and 212.1 and mentioned exceptions to this scheme such as the exclusion
of capital dividends in subsection 83(2).
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Supra note 61.
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Ibid., at paragraph 53.

93

2002 FCA 291.
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under the Act.94 Similarly, in OSFC,95 where the transactions relied on the stop-loss rule in
subsection 18(13) (as it then read) to transfer accrued losses to a non-arm’s-length
partnership, the interests in which were then sold to arm’s-length parties who deducted
their share of the losses when realized by the partnership, the Federal Court of Appeal’s
conclusion that the transactions abused a statutory “policy” against the transfer of corporate
losses among arm’s-length persons was based on a contextual analysis of provisions of the
Act, including, in particular, the loss-restriction rule in subsection 111(5).
However, after the Supreme Court decision in Canada Trustco, lower courts
became much less willing to rely on the statutory scheme in applying the GAAR. For
example, in Evans v. The Queen,96 where the minister argued that a series of transactions
was “nothing more than a surplus strip” to which the GAAR should apply,97 the Tax Court
allowed the taxpayer’s appeal on the grounds that each provision operated “exactly the way
it is supposed to do” and the only basis on which it could uphold the minister’s application
of the GAAR “would be to find that there is some overarching principle of Canadian tax
law that requires that corporate distributions to shareholders must be taxed as dividends”
which “is precisely what the Supreme Court of Canada has said we cannot do.”98 Although
it is not clear that the transactions involved surplus stripping as much as income splitting,99
the impact of Canada Trustco is clear.

94

Ibid., at paragraphs 41 and 42.
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Supra note 55, at paragraphs 82 to 98, considering the “policy” with respect to loss-trading by corporations.
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2005 TCC 684 (Evans).
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The specific transactions involved the payment of a stock dividend to the taxpayer, the sale of these shares

to a limited partnership in which the taxpayer’s three minor children each held a 33 percent interest in
exchange for a promissory note, and the payment of dividends on the shares that were used to make payments
of principal and interest on the promissory notes.
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Evans, supra note 97, at paragraph 30.
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Although the dividends were included in computing the income of the taxpayer’s minor children, tax

otherwise payable on the dividends was sheltered by the personal tax credit and the dividend tax credit. As a
result, the transactions did not actually strip the corporate surplus but shifted the tax on the surplus to the
taxpayer’s children. This aspect of the transactions is an interesting issue that was not addressed by the court.
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In Landrus v. The Queen, 100 the minister disallowed the taxpayer’s share of a
terminal loss realized by a limited partnership of which he was a member on the basis that
the loss was “only a paper loss” resulting from a disposition of the property to another
limited partnership in which the taxpayer acquired an interest.101 The Tax Court rejected
the Crown’s argument that specific stop-loss provisions (none of which specifically applied
to the transactions) evidenced a “general policy” to disregard losses on dispositions of
property within “the same economic unit.”102 According to the court, “the particularity with
which Parliament has specified the relationship that must exist between the transferor and
transferee for the purpose of each stop-loss rule … is more indicative that these rules are
exceptions to a general policy of allowing losses on all dispositions.”103
In Collins & Aikman Products Co. v. The Queen,104 the taxpayer carried out a series
of transactions that allowed it to increase cross-border paid-up capital (PUC) from CAD
475,000 to CAD167 million without the investment of tax-paid funds and then to distribute
CAD104 million as a tax-free return of capital.105 The Tax Court relied on Canada Trustco

However, it is notable that the transactions would have been subject to the tax on split income if they had
been carried out after the TOSI was enacted in 1999.
100

2008 TCC 274, aff’d. 2009 FCA 113 (Landrus).
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Ibid., at paragraph 83.
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Ibid., at paragraph 114.
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Ibid., at paragraph 120.
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2009 TCC 299, aff’d. 2010 FCA 251 (Collins & Aikman).
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The specific transactions involved the sale by the taxpayer (a US company) to a newly incorporated

Canadian company (Newco) of low-PUC and high fair market value (FMV) shares of a non-resident holding
company (Holdco) that held shares of Canadian operating companies (Opcos), the continuation of Holdco
into Canada, its amalgamation with the Opcos, the payment of an inter-corporate dividend to Newco, and the
payment of CAD104 million by Newco to the taxpayer as a return of capital. Although section 212.1 would
have reduced the PUC of the Newco shares issued to the taxpayer in exchange for the Holdco shares if Holdco
had been resident in Canada at the time, it did not apply because Holdco had not yet continued into Canada.
Although paragraph 128.1(1)(c.1) would now deem Holdco to have received a dividend equal to the
difference between the FMV and the PUC of the Opco shares when it became resident in Canada, the
transactions occurred before this provision was enacted in 1998.
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to dismiss the Crown’s argument that the transactions were contrary to a statutory scheme
against surplus stripping. Citing Canada Trustco for the proposition that the GAAR cannot
be applied based on an overriding policy that is not based on a textual, contextual, and
purposive analysis of the relevant provisions,106 the court rejected the Crown’s assertion
that the Act includes a scheme against surplus stripping on the grounds that this premise
“is not evidenced in the legislation,” nor in extrinsic aids to its interpretation.107
Similarly in Gwartz v. Canada, 108 where the taxpayer engaged in a series of
transactions to convert dividends that would otherwise have been subject to the tax on split
income (TOSI) under section 120.4 into capital gains that were not subject to the TOSI
during the years at issue, 109 the Tax Court rejected the minister’s argument that the
transactions abusively circumvented this provision on the grounds, among others, that “a
broad policy in the ITA against income splitting, grounded in specific provisions of the
ITA, other than subsection 120.4, has not been recognized.”110 Like Collins & Aikman, this
decision adhered closely to the text of the relevant provisions, concluding that the existence
of specific statutory provisions to prevent income splitting and surplus stripping suggests
that “Parliament was well aware” of opportunities to circumvent section 120.4 by
converting dividends into capital gains, 111 as a result of which it followed that “the
106

Collins & Aikman, supra note 105, at paragraph 61.

107

Ibid., at paragraph 65.

108

2013 TCC 86 (Gwartz).
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The specific transactions involved the payment by a company controlled by the taxpayer of stock

dividends with low PUC and high FMV to a family trust of which the taxpayer’s minor children were
beneficiaries, the sale by the trust of these shares to the taxpayer in exchange for a promissory note (triggering
capital gains that were allocated to the trust’s minor beneficiaries), the sale by the taxpayer of the shares to a
company controlled by his spouse in exchange for a promissory note, the redemption of the shares by the
taxpayer’s wife’s company, the use of the proceeds from the share redemption to repay the promissory note
owing to the taxpayer, and the use of these proceeds by the taxpayer to repay the promissory note owing to
the trust. The gains at issue in the case were realized in 2003, 2004 and 2005 before the enactment of
subsections 120.4(4) and (5), which made capital gains from non-arm’s-length share disposition subject to
the TOSI.
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Gwartz, supra note 109, at paragraph 53.
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Ibid., at paragraph 67.
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transactions … did not circumvent the application of section 120.4 in a manner that
constituted abusive tax avoidance for the purpose of subsection 245(4).”112
In contrast, in Copthorne,113 the Supreme Court applied the GAAR on the basis of
a statutory scheme with respect to PUC. The taxpayer engaged in a series of transactions
to convert what would otherwise have been a vertical amalgamation subject to a reduction
in PUC under subsection 87(3) into a horizontal amalgamation that was not subject to this
PUC grind, allowing it to distribute a non-taxable return of capital in excess of capital
invested in the corporate group. The Supreme Court held that the transactions were subject
to the GAAR on the basis that subsection 87(3) is part of a statutory scheme (“the PUC
scheme of the Act”) the purpose of which is to “allow … for a return of tax-paid
investment” in a corporation “without inclusion in income” while “precluding the
preservation of PUC where such preservation would allow for a withdrawal, without
liability for tax, of an amount in excess of the investment made with tax-paid funds.”114
Rejecting the taxpayer’s argument that the specificity of detailed PUC reductions in the
Act excluded the application of the GAAR to transactions that were not themselves subject
to a specific provision,115 the court observed that this “implied exclusion” argument would
render the GAAR meaningless, since the GAAR applies only to transactions that are not
subject to provisions as ordinarily interpreted.116 As a result, it concluded that, while a close
adherence to the text of the relevant provisions is appropriate in “a case of traditional
statutory interpretation,”117 this approach in misplaced in a GAAR analysis, which relies
on “the underlying rationale or object, spirit, and purpose of the legislation” not “the text
of the statute.”118
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Based on Copthorne, one might reasonably question the conclusions in Collins &
Aikman and Gwartz that the GAAR did not apply. In Collins & Aikman, the transactions
may not have been subject to specific provisions of the Act but they clearly contradicted
the PUC scheme of the Act identified in Copthorne, since they allowed the taxpayer to
withdraw, without any tax, an amount greatly exceeding its investment with tax-paid funds.
In Gwartz, the court’s conclusion that the transactions did not contradict the object, spirit,
and purpose of section 120.4 turns on the same type of implied-exclusion argument that
the Supreme Court explicitly rejected in Copthorne. Indeed, subsequent cases have applied
the GAAR to surplus-stripping and income-splitting transactions partly on the basis that
these transactions contradict statutory schemes in the Act.119
In contrast, it is difficult to disagree with the court’s conclusion in Landrus that the
particularity of the various stop-loss rules in the Act does not support the existence of a
general policy or scheme to disregard losses on dispositions of property within the same
economic unit, regardless of how this concept may be defined. As a result, it is not
surprising that the court’s conclusion on this issue has been reaffirmed in more than one
subsequent GAAR case.120
Based on Copthorne, one might also challenge the Federal Court of Appeal’s
conclusions in OSFC that the loss-trading transactions at issue did not contradict the object,
spirit, and purpose of the stop-loss rule in subsection 18(13) (as it then read) or the
partnership allocation rules in subsection 96(1). Although the court held that the
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See, for example, 1245989 Alberta Ltd. v. Canada, sub nom. Wild v. Canada, 2017 TCC 51, rev’d. 2018

FCA 114 (on other grounds) (Wild), referring to the PUC scheme of the Act to deny a tax benefit that would
otherwise have resulted from a series of transactions designed to extract corporate surpluses on a tax-free
basis; and Gervais v. Canada, 2016 TCC 180, aff’d. 2018 FCA 3, referring to the scheme of the Act governing
transfers of property and the attribution of income between spouses to conclude that a series of transactions
designed to split income was subject to the GAAR.
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See, for example, 1207192 Ontario Ltd. v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 383 at paragraph 81; and 2012 FCA

258 (Triad Gestco).
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transactions had not misused subsection 18(13) on the grounds that the purpose of the
provision at the time was not only to preclude the realization of a superficial loss on the
disposition of property to a non-arm’s length person, but also to preserve the loss “for
recognition on a later occasion by the non-arm’s length transferee,”121 this conclusion was
based on a close textual analysis of the provision that contradicts the broader purposive
approach mandated by Copthorne. The court’s conclusion that loss trading did not
contradict the partnership allocation rules in subsection 96(1) was also based on a textual
analysis of this provision,122 as well as on the implied exclusion principle that Copthorne
dismissed as unsuitable in a GAAR analysis.123
Therefore, not surprisingly, these conclusions were rejected in subsequent GAAR
cases. In Mathew,124 which involved the same series of transactions as those in OSFC, the
Supreme Court criticized the Federal Court of Appeal’s “narrow textual analysis” of
subsection 18(13),125 concluding instead that the purpose of this provision was to disallow
and preserve a loss by transferring it to a non-arm’s-length transferee “because it essentially
remains in the transferor’s control,”126 and that the transactions “frustrated Parliament’s
purpose of confining the transfer of the losses … to a non-arm’s-length partnership.”127 In
Canada v. 594710 British Columbia Ltd., 128 the taxpayer participated in a series of
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Ibid., at paragraph 99, stating that the partnership allocation rules contained “no restrictions on loss trading
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most other stop-loss rules to preserve the disallowed loss in the hands of the transferor to be realized when
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transactions intended to allocate taxable income of a partnership to an arm’s length
corporation with accumulated non-capital losses. The Federal Court of Appeal concluded
that the transactions were contrary to the object, spirit, and purpose of subsection 96(1), on
the grounds that the purpose of this provision is to allocate income or losses among the
members of a partnership who are entitled to these amounts because they were members
of the partnership when the transactions occurred,129and not “to allocate taxable income
in a manner that does not assist the organizational structure of the partnership or the
efficient conduct of the partnership business.”130
Similarly, in Canada v. Oxford Properties Group Inc., 131 where the taxpayer
carried out an elaborate series of transactions in order to avoid recapture of depreciation on
the sale of real estate properties by transferring them on a tax-deferred basis through a
tiered partnership structure, increasing the adjusted cost base of the partnership interests,
and selling these interests to tax-exempt purchasers, the Federal Court of Appeal criticized
the Tax Court’s GAAR analysis on the basis that it was based narrowly on the text of the
provisions rather than on their object, spirit, and purpose.132 According to the Court, the
purpose of excluding depreciable capital property from the bump provisions in subsections
88(1) and 98(3) is to prevent “property that is taxed on the basis of a 50% rate of inclusion
to augment the [tax cost] of property that is taxed on the basis of a 100% rate of
inclusion,”133 and that a purpose of subsection 100(1) is to ensure that tax is paid on the
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of the Income War Tax Act, RSC 1927, c. 97, on which subsection 96(1) is based, and stating that the notion
of entitlement “reflects the foundational principle of the Act that taxpayers are to be taxed on their own
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latent recapture with respect to a partnership’s depreciable property “which would
otherwise go unpaid on a subsequent sale of the depreciable property by the tax-exempt
purchaser.” 134 On this basis, it held that the transactions frustrated the purpose of
subsection 100(1) to the extent that they allowed the taxpayer to avoid tax on the latent
recapture, 135 defeated the rationale for excluding depreciable property from the bump
provisions since property subject to tax on the basis of a 50 percent rate of inclusion was
used to prevent recapture on property subject to a 100 percent rate of inclusion,136 and
abused the rollover provisions in subsections 97(2) and (4) because the subsequent
transactions converted the deferred recapture on the transfer of the real estate properties to
the partnerships into a permanent exclusion.137 Therefore, as in Copthorne, the application
of the GAAR turned on a broad contextual and purposive analysis of the relevant statutory
provisions.
The decision in Copthorne also confirms that it is misleading to suggest, as some
GAAR decisions have done, that the GAAR cannot be applied to deny tax benefits resulting
from a gap in the legislation.138 Although such a conclusion is appropriate in cases where
a presumed scheme (such as disallowing losses on dispositions of property within the same
“economic unit”) is not sufficiently well-established to determine that the transaction at
134

Ibid., at paragraph 101. This provision applies, among other circumstances, where a taxpayer disposes of

a partnership interest to a tax-exempt entity, deeming the capital gain to be the total of (a) one-half of the
capital gain as may reasonably be regarded as attributable to increases in the value of non-depreciable capital
property held directly by the partnership or indirectly through one or more other partnerships, and (b) the
whole of the remaining portion of the capital gain.
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concluding that the minister’s use of the GAAR to “fill the gaps left by Parliament in subsection 85(5.1) …
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the use of the GAAR “to fill in what [the Minister] perceives to be a possible gap left by Parliament … would
be an inappropriate use of the GAAR”.
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issue results in a misuse or abuse of the relevant provisions, it is incorrect where the
existence of a statutory scheme (such as the PUC scheme of the Act) is clear enough to
conclude that the transaction contradicts the object, spirit, and purpose of the relevant
provisions. 139 As a result, while the Federal Court of Appeal has rightly held that the
Crown’s burden to establish that a transaction results in a misuse or abuse cannot be
discharged “merely by asserting that the transaction was not foreseen or that it exploits a
previously unnoticed legislative gap,” 140 the identification of a statutory scheme may
suggest that the exploitation of a previously unnoticed legislative gap constitutes abusive
tax avoidance. In this circumstance, as the Tax Court has stated, the purpose and effect of
the GAAR is “to close the gaps that sophisticated tax plans seek to exploit.”141
(2)

Deficiencies of the Single Unified Approach
Although Copthorne established that the GAAR can be applied based on a

contextual analysis of a statutory scheme without relying on an “overriding policy”, it did
not challenge the “single unified approach” adopted in Canada Trustco which emphasizes
“the specific provisions in issue” rather than the broader statutory scheme of which they
may be a part.142 As a result, although the contextual analysis of a statutory scheme may
inform a court’s interpretation of the object, spirit, and purpose of the relevant provisions,
the application of the GAAR appears to depend on a conclusion that the avoidance
transaction at issue contradicts the object, spirit, and purpose of one or more specific
provisions, rather than the scheme itself.
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For example, in Copthorne, the court’s conclusion that the transactions resulted in
a misuse or abuse within the meaning of subsection 245(4) did not depend directly on a
conclusion that they were contrary to the object, spirit, and purpose of the PUC scheme of
the Act, but instead, that they were contrary to the object, spirit, and purpose of the PUC
reduction for vertical amalgamations in subsection 87(3) – which the court interpreted in
light of its contextual analysis of the statutory scheme for PUC. Similarly. in Triad
Gestco143 where the transactions entered into by the taxpayer created an offsetting capital
gain and loss, but only the loss was realized for tax purposes, the Federal Court of Appeal
held that the transactions were subject to the GAAR not because the creation of a paper
loss was contrary to the “underlying policy” of the statutory scheme for capital gains and
losses to recognize “real gains and losses” that affect a taxpayer’s “economic power,”144
but because they resulted in “an abuse and misuse of the relevant provisions, specifically
paragraphs 38(b), 39(1)(b) and 40(1)(b).”145
Although the decision in each of these cases, namely, that the GAAR should apply
is justified, the analysis is unsatisfactory, since it reads into otherwise relatively mechanical
provisions of the Act an object, spirit, and purpose that properly inheres in the statutory
scheme as a whole rather than in the individual provisions themselves. 146 Therefore, it
would have been more persuasive for the courts to have concluded that these transactions
abused the provisions of the relevant statutory schemes read as a whole, instead of
concluding that they abused or misused specific provisions. For this reason, the single
unified approach adopted in Canada Trustco impedes the coherent application of the
GAAR.
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Supra note 121.
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Ibid., at paragraphs 47 and 41-42.
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Ibid., at paragraph 50.
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For a similar point, see Darmo and Fournier, supra note 53, at 37:12, explaining that a purposive analysis

is “generally unhelpful” for technical or computational provisions, the underlying rationale of which is best
disclosed by contextual analysis of other provisions comprising a statutory scheme.
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Conclusion
This chapter has examined the interpretive exercise under the GAAR, contrasting
this interpretive exercise with ordinary interpretation under the TCP approach, and
critically evaluating the interpretive framework that the Supreme Court has established for
this interpretive exercise in Canada Trustco and Copthorne.
As the first part of the chapter explains, although the TCP approach and the
interpretive exercise under the GAAR both consider the text, context, and purpose of the
provisions at issue, the aim and function of these interpretive exercises differ, since the
TCP approach relies on textual, contextual, and purposive analysis in order to determine
the meaning of the words at issue, while a GAAR analysis employs this method of
interpretation to determine the “the rationale that underlies the words” that is relied upon
to deny a tax benefit that would otherwise result from an avoidance transaction that
contradicts the object, spirit, and purpose of the relevant provisions or the broader scheme
of which they are a part. As a result, the TCP approach is constrained by the text of the
relevant provisions in a way that a GAAR analysis is not – reflecting rule-of-law principles
of legislative supremacy and legal certainty, the latter of which is legitimately superseded
by an anti-abuse principle in the context of a GAAR.
As the second part of the chapter explains, the single unified approach adopted by
the Supreme Court in Canada Trustco disregards the text of subsection 245(4), which
clearly distinguishes between a misuse of specific provisions and an abuse having regard
to these provisions read as a whole, downplays the relevance of broader statutory schemes
in the application of the GAAR, and conflates the interpretive exercise under the GAAR
with the ordinary interpretation of tax provisions under the TCP approach thereby
exaggerating the role of textual considerations in a GAAR analysis. To the extent that
Copthorne modified this interpretive framework by lessening the influence of textual
considerations and increasing the influence of contextual considerations in GAAR
analysis, it is a welcome development that has had a significant impact on GAAR
decisions. However, continued adherence to the single unified approach adopted in Canada
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Trustco is contrary to the text of subsection 245(4) and may also impede the coherent
application of the GAAR.
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